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Abstract. The advancement in technology has transformed Cyber Physical Systems and their interface 
with IoT into a more sophisticated and challenging paradigm. As a result, vulnerabilities and potential 
attacks manifest themselves considerably more than before, forcing researchers to rethink the conventional 
strategies that are currently in place to secure such physical systems. This manuscript studies the complex 
interweaving of sensor networks and physical systems and suggests a foundational innovation in the field. 
In sharp contrast with the existing IDS and IPS solutions, in this paper, a preventive and proactive method is 
employed to stay ahead of attacks by constantly monitoring network data patterns and identifying threats 
that are imminent. Here, by capitalizing on the significant progress in processing power (e.g. petascale 
computing) and storage capacity of computer systems, we propose a deep learning approach to predict and 
identify various security breaches that are about to occur.  The learning process takes place by collecting a 
large number of files of different types and running tests on them to classify them as benign or malicious. 
The prediction model obtained as such can then be used to identify attacks. Our project articulates a new 
framework for interactions between physical systems and sensor networks, where malicious packets are 
repeatedly learned over time while the system continually operates with respect to imperfect security 
mechanisms. 
1 Introduction 
The world is at the brink of a new digital revolution and 
Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) based on the Internet of 
Things (IoT) networks mark the next frontier. IoT allows 
companies to increase productivity, city services to 
converge, vehicles to become autonomous, and homes to 
become smarter. There has been much research on the 
design, evaluation, testing, and verification of CPS and 
its associated IoT. Nonetheless, research on the 
development of security models and frameworks for IoT 
networks is very limited. A key challenge is that security 
solutions for IoT should not hinder the openness of the 
network, nor should they introduce additional latency or 
overhead to communications across the network. These 
requirements are achieved by incorporating security into 
the design of IoT infrastructures. This project is focused 
on two main principles: “adaptive security architecture” 
and “IoT-based CPS or ICPS” both of which are listed 
on Gartner’s 2016 top 10 strategic technology trends. 
Dozens of hardware platforms of embedded 
systems are gaining popularity as prototypes of IoT [1-2]. 
Smart objects and embedded sensors are currently 
secured based on the same best practices of traditional 
networks without considering the limitations imposed by 
the proliferation of smart nodes in terms of processing 
power and memory. This is mainly due to limited 
research in this field. Encapsulation of protocol stack 
layers is done on a single hardware processor and thus, 
leaving the lower layers unprotected has detrimental 
effects. With so many new forms of data, new forms of 
threats will come to existence targeting them. 
Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) can be found as 
standalone platforms, or as modules integrated into other 
hardware, or even as software applications with the two 
categories of IDS being Network-based and Host-based 
IDS. New generations of devices bring along newer and 
more sophisticated generation of threat agents and 
attacks. This concern is addressed by integrating security 
in design and thus, preventing the problem from 
happening. ICPS lack a secure design for 
implementation. Because IoT systems utilize diverse 
protocols and technologies encompassing a wide array of 
technology concepts such as Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs), sensor-equipped edge devices, and 
messaging protocols, they are prone to different attacks. 
Additionally, lack of standardization to support IoT 
increases heterogeneity of these networks and introduces 
inoperable components which will create vulnerabilities. 
Because of utilizing a wide array of heterogeneous and 
often unreliable smart objects, there is a need for a 
reliable design model capable of supporting bandwidth-
intensive applications. 
The design objectives of this framework are twofold: 
first, to address security concerns; and second, to provide 
on-demand security guidelines for the next generation of 
CPS. The research questions are: a) What are the 
security vulnerabilities and challenges presented by the 
emerging technologies (e.g. 802.11.5, ZigBee, GPRS, 
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LTE) in providing IoT connectivity? b) Can Deep 
Learning (DL) be as successful on IoT security as it has 
been in computer vision and speech recognition? c) Can 
security by design guideline and frameworks outperform 
the existing security patches and protocols? and d) How 
different are the security gaps for smart city sensors and 
gateways from those of traditional networks. 
2 Vulnerability analyses 
2.1. IoT Security  
The IoT is composed of many layers of technologies, 
each with its own set of security challenges. Smart 
devices are more capable of gathering and curating 
sensed data which makes them more susceptible to being 
targeted by a variety of attack types from single target 
impersonation, rogue nodes, and privileged access to 
batched ones such as botnets and DDoS. It has been 
reported by FCC's Technological Advisory Council 
(TAC) that hackers have the lead in breaching the IoT 
security. The reasons are threefold: i) Conventional 
network security wisdom is not applicable to the IoT 
realm. IoT is an ecosystem driven by business gaps, 
rather than just a myriad of devices; ii) IoT 
manufacturers don’t prioritize security and lack a 
security culture. IoT vendors compromise security to 
gain functionality and openness for a broader target 
market. IoT manufacturers follow agile manifesto for 
their development process which opens up many security 
gaps; and iii) There are inherent vulnerabilities in 
individual IoT nodes: a) For many types of IoT devices, 
physical access cannot be restricted, thus devices that 
expose critical information on internal nodes can be 
compromised; b) Although chip manufacturing 
innovations have led to the emergence of embedded 
chips with hardware-based security (e.g. ARM 
TrustZone) and hardware with cryptography support (e.g. 
ARMv8), the inclusion of such chips in every device is 
cost prohibitive. Thus, it makes sense to look for 
network security solutions that do not require 
modification of existing and emerging IoT devices; and c) 
IoT nodes generally don’t support advanced networking 
capabilities and in particular security protocols. The 
proposal aims to advance insight to IoT and identify its 
vulnerabilities, while attempting to develop 
methodologies to guard against cyber-attacks that can 
penetrate the IoT layers through a wide range of 
heterogeneous devices. Securing systems from a network 
design perspective defines security zones and layers 
based on data requirements of each network segment, 
independently of device type and location. This is 
different from encrypted IoT chips and restricted 
physical access to IoT nodes, and enhances protection 
against zero-day attacks and well-known threats. 
2.2 Smart City  
Cities are rapidly converging toward digital technologies 
to provide advanced information services, efficient 
management, and resource utilization that will positively 
impact all aspects of our life and economy. This has led 
to the proliferation of ubiquitous connectivity to critical 
infrastructures (electrical grid, utility networks, health 
care, finance, etc.) that are used to deliver advanced 
information services to homes, businesses, and 
government. On the other hand, such smart systems are 
more complex, dynamic, heterogeneous, and have many 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by cyberattacks. 
Protecting and securing the resources and services of 
smart cities become critically important due to the 
disruptive or even potentially life-threatening nature of a 
failure or attack on smart cities' infrastructures. 
A resilient architecture that protects smart cities' 
communications, controls, and computations based on 
autonomic computing and Moving Target Defense 
(MTD) techniques was proposed in [3]. The key idea 
was to make it extremely difficult for the attackers to 
figure out the current active execution environments 
used to run smart city services by randomizing the use of 
these resources at runtime. 
An important part of Smart City is wireless 
communication networks which are pervading the IoT 
realm due to their fast, easy, and inexpensive 
deployment. Pervasive wireless technologies have higher 
security requirements. Even though the existing security 
protocols for wireless communications address the 
privacy and confidentiality issues, various unaddressed 
vulnerabilities exist. Such vulnerabilities target cyber 
and physical availability of the systems, spoof data link 
and network layer addresses protocols, or even upper 
layer session hijacking. 
Table 1. Mapping known attacks to smart city 
Attacks 
Main 
Characteristics 
Mapping to Smart City 
DoS Rendering a device 
unusable through 
exhaustion of 
target’s resources 
Smart City 
sensors/loggers have 
more limited resources 
(e.g. CPU & RAM) 
DDoS 
A type of DoS 
where the source are 
thousands of 
zombies 
50 billion devices 
targeted to become 
zombies and the same 50 
billion are potential 
victims 
IP 
Spoofing 
An unauthorized use 
of someone else’s 
logical address 
More valid addresses 
increase susceptibility of 
spoofing attacks 
Physical 
Attack 
Someone getting 
physically close to 
network 
components 
More connected devices 
equal easier physical 
access to them 
Eaves-
dropping 
Type of 
reconnaissance 
More data leads to a 
higher probability of 
reconnaissance gaps 
Sybil 
Subversion of 
reputation systems 
by forged identities 
in peer-to-peer 
networks 
Wireless Sensor 
Networks are the main 
target for Sybil attacks 
Black 
hole 
Packet drop on 
intermediary 
devices 
Limited resources on 
Smart City sensors and 
nodes are easy targets 
 
2
MATEC Web of Conferences 208, 05001 (2018) https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201820805001
ICMIE 2018
2.3 Smart city data analytics  
Smart city can be illustrated as a complex network with 
different types of relationships. These relationships can 
be as simple as a one direction data connection to as 
complicated as a weighted prioritized two-way 
connection between a gateway and a data logger. Smart 
nodes are placed in communities of similar purpose 
devices. Based on the Confidentiality, Integrity, Security 
(CIA) mechanisms and addressing such vertices using 
Authentication, Authorization, Accounting (AAA), 
smart city security is adding different layers of access for 
every user of the network. Finding communities of 
similar devices with similar purposes is possible through 
evaluating similar relationship between devices which 
are known as nodes in the networks. Finding these 
communities can help level out and separate different 
levels of domains for various type of relationships and 
access. 
 In today’s world, networks are as big as billions of 
nodes and smart cities are no different. To secure them, 
we need to put them in partitions and secure each 
partition both separately and as a group. To find these 
partition, also known as communities, there are big data 
community detection algorithms that could be used. Also 
ranking the partition could facilitate finding out which 
partitions can achieve a higher level of security. Security 
can be better handled if appropriate set of partitions are 
identified within the networks. With sub-partitioning, 
systems such as Hadoop can make the parallel data 
handling possible [4]. 
2.4 Existing methods  
Alipour et al. [5] analyzed intrusion detection systems 
for Media Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer 
(PHY) specifications using an anomaly-based behavioral 
analysis to detect abnormal behaviors, which are likely 
to be triggered by threat agents. They did this by 
monitoring the n-consecutive transitions of the protocol 
state machine. Then, sequential Machine Learning 
techniques were applied to model the n-transition 
patterns in the protocol. The probabilities of these 
transitions were normalized, reaching a low false 
positive of less than 0.1%. Spoofers impersonate 
legitimate users to exploit the user services and 
privileges. The Semi-Global Alignment algorithm (SGA) 
is an efficient technique to detect spoof attacks. The 
limitation of SGA is that it cannot be applied to large 
scale, multiuser systems due to high false positive rates. 
Kholidy et al. [6] proposed the Data-Driven SGA which 
improves the scoring systems using distinct alignment 
parameters per user. It also adapts to changes in the user 
behavior by updating the signature of a user according to 
his/her current behavior. The main objective of this 
proposal is to design a secure architectural framework 
for implementation of IoT-based, small to large-scale 
CPS in Smart City. This is important because of the 
inevitable migration to IoT networks and the unsafe and 
insecure nature of the underlying sensor-embedded smart 
objects, which interact with the physical world. 
Traditional security solutions might address security 
needs of IoT in part but there are challenges such as 
platform security limitations, ubiquitous mobility, mass 
quantities, and cloud-based operations that are not 
addressed. 
3 The proposed approach 
This research proposes a tunable underlying framework 
for IoT networks of different sizes which will, in turn, 
open many new research opportunities in IoT security. In 
addition, this research will facilitate and expedite 
adoption of small to large-scale IoT-based. But in the 
CPS context, security takes new forms and some of the 
previously used solutions such as Host-based IDS are not 
practical due to limited hardware resources on endpoint 
sensors. Adding to the issue is the fast-growing number 
of such sensors and their faster adoption by the public 
resulting in their widespread use without taking into 
account the many security gaps. Together with scientific 
advances in sensing and communications technologies, 
many consumers are using body sensors, connecting 
their generated data to their online profiles, or storing 
them on their smartphones or laptops. This project 
employs four technologies or methods as discussed 
below. The logical relation among these pieces is 
presented in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. Framework-Development Process 
 Anomaly-based, also called behavior-based, 
methods assume that attackers behave differently than 
normal users. The advantage of this method is the ability 
to spot a threat without first knowing its signature. 
Historically, this advantage has been offset by high false 
positive rates, the difficulty of training a system in a 
highly dynamic environment, and computational expense 
[7]. Some instances of the targeted vulnerabilities are 
presented in Table 2. It should be noted that most of the 
new attacks are typically minor mutations of the known 
ones, which leads us to believe that the DL approach can 
be successful on detecting imminent attacks. DL 
methods are successfully incorporated in various 
domains because DL relies on local proximity (typically 
spatial and/or temporal) among patterns to find and 
construct higher order patterns (Figure 2). 
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Fig. 2. Overarching Scheme of Threat Prediction 
 The factors moving Machine Learning tools and 
techniques from the research lab to the operational 
domain include both the phenomenal growth in 
inexpensive compute power and bandwidth and the 
overwhelming amount of data generated and dumped 
into Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
tools daily. Although Machine Learning tools can be 
very effective, they produce very different results 
depending on the source and quality of data being 
analyzed. Specific domain knowledge related to 
security—as opposed to clinical research or finance, for 
example—is needed to design a threat detection system 
using appropriate Machine Learning mathematical and 
statistical algorithms. A data scientist must apply 
security domain knowledge to identify primary and 
secondary sources of data, determine how to clean and 
transform acquired data and select the best Machine 
Learning analytical method or algorithm for the problem 
at hand. Primary sources for the security domain include 
network packets, Machine Learning -based analysis of 
which reveals otherwise invisible communication 
patterns from an attacker inside the network. Secondary 
sources are logs routinely collected from other devices, 
which may provide additional depth to the analysis but 
not direct evidence of activity due to the nature of logs’ 
role in providing security defences [7]. 
4 Results and discussions 
DL [13] is a field that encompasses machine learning so 
it can be used to learn intricate patterns from large 
volumes of data. It is generally an architecture formed 
out of neural network activation functions. Supervised 
and Unsupervised learning refer to labeled and non-
labeled data respectively [14]. For supervised learning, 
techniques such as Recurrent Neural Networks (fast and 
efficient), Convolutional Neural Networks (Time 
consuming, but suitable for special data, such as images), 
Long Short Term Memory (which can be used for 
vanishing gradient problem [15] which occurs nearing 
the end of training, where gradient is supposed to be 
really less) apart from the traditional neural networks 
such as Deep Boltzmann Machines or Deep Belief 
Networks as well as fully connected, slow-to-train Multi-
Layer Perceptron [14]. Each layer of the deep models 
shown below can be consisting of linear or complex 
activation functions depending on the overall complexity 
of the problem. For instance, for malware detection 
problem, we stacked two layers with linear activations 
with two layers of Rectified Linear Units in between 
them. This was implemented to get the best accuracy of 
prediction for the given data [16]. In this study, CSIC 
2010 HTTP Dataset was used to detect web attacks using 
session IDs and indices. This data set has been widely 
used for abnormal behavior detection. Regarding web 
traffic, some of the problems of this data set are that it is 
out of date and also that it does not include enough 
actual attacks and hence, it is criticized by security 
researchers. 
 This is a proven benchmark initially set for 
researchers to compare different methods of detection 
and classification of network attacks. It was built as an 
improvement over the earlier KDD Cup 1999 dataset in 
the form of a reduction in redundant records, 
proportionate number of records in each difficulty level 
group [16]. Experts believe that new attacks can be 
mostly identified by the signature of the known attacks. 
According to this principle, we train the data on the 
features given in this dataset, and some derived from 
them. They include, but are not limited to the duration, 
protocol type, destination network service, source and 
destination lengths in bytes, flags, number of wrong 
fragments, the number of high QoS packets, etc. The 
results show the logistic regression classification, where 
the Dependent Variable is categorical, can perform 
anomaly detection efficiently. The ROC curve 
characterizing the preliminary results is outlined in 
Figure 3. As illustrated in Figure 3, a simple logistic 
regression classification with two parameters can 
achieve a performance of 64%. Utilizing DL techniques 
with a multitude of features results in higher accuracy. 
Logistic regression classifies data into two categories, 
and the Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve 
indicates the area under the curve which signifies the 
percentage of accurate classification. According to the 
results on the dataset, accuracy percentage is 86%. A 
standard metric to evaluate logistic regression 
classification is accuracy, which is calculated by 
dividing true Positives over the sum of false positives 
and true positives. 
 
Fig. 3. ROC Curve of Logistic Regression 
 The learning model consists of an input vector X. 
Logits are outputs of linear functions – that are 
continuous and differentiable. Logits need to be 
converted into a scale of probabilities [0,1]. The weight 
and bias parameters need training. This linear block can 
be cascaded with multiple different linear blocks that 
sum up to learn different features of the input. However, 
to increase the complexity to define finer features of the 
input, we need a combination of non-linear elements that 
can do so. This can be achieved by combining rectified 
linear units that scale inputs. Once Softmax function 
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converts logits into probabilities we can use these values 
to be given to series of Rectified Linear Units. 
 Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs) can be shown as: 
 
where, x = input vector, f(x) = output of a rectified linear 
unit. A series of ReLUs [17] cascaded together can form 
a computationally expensive, although fairly efficient 
non-linear differentiable model to model complexities of 
a function. ReLUs can be replaced by functions such as 
Sigmoid, Tanh, etc. Figure 4 presents the comparison 
diagram of such non-linear functions for the preliminary 
results. Sigmoid functions are used for logistic 
regression functions. ReLUs outperform sigmoid and 
give better classification accuracy only by a slight 
margin. Thus, both are widely used and give comparable 
results. They introduce non-linearity while pooling up 
layers of one convolutional layer on others. Components 
of the learning model are depicted in Figure 5. 
 In general, the linear blocks or layers can be stacked 
upon each other, with non-linear interface as shown 
below. DL Model (forward propagation) [18] is the very 
basis of learning in which features from the first layer is 
carried forward to the next layer. For training, a widely 
popular algorithm is Back-Propagation [19], in which 
gradients or relative difference between iterations of 
calculating weight functions are minimized by a 
backward-looking architecture as shown below. Back 
propagation is a mean-squared-error function which is 
differentiable. 
 
Fig. 4. ReLUs and Max-Pooling/Sigmoid Functions 
 
Fig. 4. Classification Results 
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